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III. STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction lies with this court pursuant to Utah Code Ann.§ 78A-4-103(l)(e). 
Rule 3 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure also permits appeals as of right to be 
taken from final orders of the District Court. 
IV. STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
A. IN ORDERING THE AMOUNT OF RESTITUTION, THE TRIAL 
COURT MADE IMPERMISSIBLE INFERENCES ABOUT THE SCOPE 
OF MR. POULSEN'S ALLEGED CRIMINAL ACTIVITIES THAT GO 
BEYOND HIS ADMISSIONS. 
B. THERE WAS NOT A SUFFICIENT LEGAL AND FACTUAL NEXUS 
BETWEEN THE FACT PLED TO AND THE RESTITUTION 
ORDERED. 
C. THE RESTITUTION ORDERED BY THE TRIAL COURT VIOLATES 
DUE PROCESS. 
V. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Trial court orders of restitution will not be disturbed unless the trial court exceeds 
the authority prescribed by law or abuses its discretion. State v. Robinson, 860 P.2d 979 
(Utah App. 1993). To the extent there are statutory interpretations, they are reviewed for 
correctness, giving no deference to the trial court's interpretation. State v. Paul, 860 P.2d 
992 (Utah App. 1093). 
VI. DETERMINATIVE LAW 
Amendments 5 & 14 to the U. S. Constitution; Article 1, § 11, Utah Constitution; 
Rule 3, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure; Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201(4); § 76-6a-2(4); 
1 
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§ 76-6a-4(2); § 77-38a-302; § 78A-4-103(l)(e); State v. Robinson, 860 P.2d 979 (Utah 
App. 1993); State v. Houston, 9 P.3d 188 (Utah App. 2000); State v. Watson, 987 P.2d 
1289 (Utah App. 1999); State v. Larsen, 221 P.3d 277 (Utah App. 2009). 
VII. STATEMENT OF CASE AND FACTS 
Appellant David Q. Poulsen ("Mr. Poulsen"),1 along with his LDS ward bishop, 
one Robert Clark, and a co-worker named Michael Keith, placed their money with Mr. 
Poulsen's Elders Quorum President, one Larry Bosch. Mr. Bosch was later charged by 
the Utah County prosecutor with various securities-related crimes which are currently 
pending in State District Court Case No. 090403630. It was also alleged in a federal 
court civil case filed against Mr. Bosch (and others) by his victims that Mr. Bosch 
defrauded other innocent parties out of an amount in excess of 5 million dollars. See, 
Federal District Court Case No. 2:08 cv 00951. Mr. Poulsen lost more than $100,000 to 
Mr. Bosch, which led directly to Mr. Poulsen filing personal bankruptcy. Mr. Clark and 
Mr. Keith also lost a combined amount of $168,400 to Mr. Bosch. Stipulation in 
Restitution Hearing. R. 79, p. 4,11. 1-3, Addendum "B.M At his initial appearance, Mr. 
Poulsen entered into a plea bargain, by which he pled guilty to two Class B 
misdemeanors counts of participating in a pyramid scheme arising under Utah Code Ann. 
1
 Mr. Poulsen's real name is Quang Quoc Pham. He immigrated to the United 
States from Viet Nam as a young man. He was taken in by Hal and Neva Poulsen. Due 
to delayed English skills, he is extremely naive and unsophisticated in matters of 
business. Plea Hearing, R. 78, p. 7: 1-15, Addendum "A." 
2 
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§ 76-6a-4(2).2 Plea Hearing, R. 78, p. 6: 1-7, Addendum "A." The restitution hearing 
was deferred to a later date. Id. Mr. Poulsen was fined $555, and ordered to perform 60 
hours of community service. Id. at p. 9: 8-11. Meanwhile, Mr. Poulsen's counsel filed a 
Request for Dismissal of the Restitution Hearing. R. 24, Addendum "C." The grounds for 
the request for dismissal are essentially those grounds that support the current appeal. Id. 
The Court denied the request for dismissal of the restitution hearing without any 
explanation. Ruling, R. 55, Addendum "D." At the restitution hearing, which occurred 
nearly one year after the plea agreement was entered, Mr. Poulsen again stipulated that 
Mr. Keith and Mr. Clark had lost investment fluids of $168,400. Restitution Hearing, R. 
79, p. 4: 20-22, Addendum "B." Mr. Poulsen's counsel attempted to argue or put on 
evidence that although acknowledging the loss to the victims, the loss was not the result 
of any actions by Mr. Poulsen. Id. at p. 5: 17-20; p. 6: 1-4. The court refused to permit 
any direct or proffered evidence related to anything other than the financial capacity of 
the defendant. Id. at p.l 1: 4-16. Accordingly, although there was a stipulation in the 
record that the victims lost money, and an admission that Mr. Poulsen participated in a 
pyramid scheme, the record is devoid of any factual predicate linking the acts, statements, 
or representations of Mr. Poulsen to the losses incurred by the his co-participants. 
2
 This statues reads: "2) Any person who participates in a pyramid scheme only by 
receiving compensation for the introduction of other persons into the pyramid scheme 
rather than from the sale of goods, services, or other property is guilty of a class B 
misdemeanor." 
3 
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VIII. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
In entering the restitution order, the trial court did not rely upon what was admitted 
to in the plea hearing, but rather made impermissible inferences as to the conduct of the 
defendant/appellant, David Q. Poulsen, in relation to the victims, and in establishing a 
causal link to the putative damages. Further, there is no record evidence showing a 
casual link between the crime admitted to and the alleged damages of the victims. 
Moreover, the damages are too attenuated in relation to the crime to which Mr. Poulsen 
admitted. Finally, the defendant was ordered to make restitution without basic due 
process considerations in violation of the fifth and fourteenth amendments to the United 
States Constitution. 
IX. ARGUMENT 
A. IN ORDERING THE AMOUNT OF RESTITUTION, THE TRIAL 
COURT MADE IMPERMISSIBLE INFERENCES ABOUT THE 
SCOPE OF MR. POULSEN'S ALLEGED CRIMINAL ACTIVITIES 
THAT GO BEYOND HIS ADMISSIONS. 
Utah Code Ami. § 77-38a-302(5) states that a restitution order is to be based upon 
"...any criminal conduct admitted to by the defendant to the sentencing court or to which 
the defendant agrees to pay restitution." There was no agreement to pay restitution. The 
basic facts to which the defendant agreed was that he participated in a pyramid scheme in 
which various people lost a total $168,400. Plea Hearing, R. 78, p. 5: 18-21, Addendum 
"A." During a short perfunctory plea hearing, the following colloquy took place between 
the court, the prosecutor, and counsel for the defendant: 
4 
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MS. O'BRYANT: Your Honor, we still need to set the restitution—. 
THE JUDGE: Yes. 
MS. O'BRYANT: —and I think it's going to probably take the entire 12 months to 
get everything taken care of. 
THE JUDGE: Should we just set a, do you have a number now? 
MS. O'BRYANT: Well, we have the total number of restitution. I don't think he 
has the ability to pay that. And that's what we wanted to discuss to see if we could come 
up with a stipulation as to court ordered probation. 
THE JUDGE: We'll probably put the order riglit now. What is the total number? 
MS. O'BRYANT: The total number is $168,440, or— 
THE JUDGE: And you agreed to that, so we don't need a hearing on that? 
MR. MARK POULSEN: No, 1 don't agree that that's the proper amount. 
THE JUDGE: Okay. 
MR. MARK POULSEN: That is the amount that various people invested, but he 
didn't get that or any approaching that so a— 
THE JUDGE: Well, then that's not the amount that he should pay if that's your 
position. 
MS. O'BRYANT: Right. That's, our position is not that that is the amount that— 
THE JUDGE: It's not a judgment— 
MS. O'BRYANT: —he should have to pay. 
5 
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THE JUDGE: —against him so. 
MS. O'BRYANT: That's the total loss. 
THE JUDGE: Okay. 
Plea Hearing, R. 78, p. 10: 4-25; p. 11: 1-10. Addendum "A." 
The forgoing represents the in-court discussion related to the subject of restitution 
at the plea hearing. Later, Mr. Poulsen sought a dismissal of the restitution hearing, 
which the court denied without explanation. R. 31, Addendum CCC"; R. 55, Addendum 
"D." When the restitution hearing was finally scheduled on March 29, 2011, the 
testimony was also sparse: 
MR. MARK POULSEN: Your Honor, may I approach? 
THE JUDGE: Yes. Uh-huh (affirmative). 
MR. MARK POULSEN: I think to be clear, Your Honor, we would stipulate that 
the, the dollar figures that you see there are amounts that victims put into this. 
I, I reiterate that there has to be a nexus between the allegations pled to, which is 
participating in a pyramid scheme, and the restitution in this case. And I don't believe 
that that 168 represents a nexus in any way, shape or form to, to the injury— 
THE JUDGE: That's the argument you made to me that I denied though, isn't it? 
MR. MARK POULSEN: I'm not sure if that's, if that's what the basis of your 
denial was, Your Honor. I'm not sure— 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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THE JUDGE: That was the basis— 
MR. MARK POULSEN: —if that's what you said. 
THE JUDGE: —of your case though, wasn't it? 
MR. MARK POULSEN: My request was to dismiss the hearing. 
THE JUDGE: Yes. 
MR. MARK POULSEN: I think the court can still have a hearing but still make a 
decision as to the appropriateness of the relationship between the a... 
We DON'T concede though those victims lost that at the hands of this person. 
There's no facts in the record to support that, Your Honor. Any facts would be hearsay 
to that effect. 
We pled very simply to participating in a pyramid scheme. I ask the court in all 
earnest that the restitution order be tied to only those facts. Otherwise we wouldn't have 
pled to them, Your Honor. 
I would say further, had we known that we were going to be facing $168,000 in 
restitution, I would rather take, try the case and have the offense, you know, dealt with in 
a full and fair hearing than plead to participating in a pyramid scheme and still face a 
$168,000 payback. 
Restitution Hearing, R. 79, p. 4: 18-25; p. 5: 1-25; p. 6: 14. Addendum tcB." 
The forgoing colloquy between the court and counsel for Mr. Poulsen shows that 
Mr. Poulsen was trying to get facts into the record by which the court could make a 
7 
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determination as to whether or not there was any relationship between Mr. Poulsen's 
participation in a pyramid scheme, and any of the losses to the victims. Despite counsel's 
persistent efforts which were becoming annoying to the court, the judge would not permit 
such evidence. Later, the same topic came up. 
THE JUDGE: Okay. So lets make sure that you're both a, representing to me the 
standard of review for the court here today. You both stipulate and agree that the real 
purpose of the hearing is to determine not the amount of restitution, that been fixed and is 
full and complete at the 168,400. Right? But the order should be based on his ability to 
pay correct? 
MS. O'BRYANT: Yes, Your honor. 
THE JUDGE: Do you agree with that? 
MR. POULSEN: I do agree with that. 
THE JUDGE: And what you've presented to me is the only evidence that I have 
before me to determine his ability to pay. Correct? 
MR. MARK POULSEN: Yes. As well as appropriateness. If I could state for the 
record, as well as the appropriateness of the payment in the nexus to the crime is, I 
believe, a proper standard for the court to follow. 
THE JUDGE: I'm not quite sure. You keep arguing to me and I'm not sure I 
understand it. Because that was before me before and I, I think I denied that, that 
argument that you have made that there should be a restitution that, no restitution in this 
8 
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case because it's not appropriate to the crime that he committed, 
MR. MARK POULSEN: And the only thing again I would like to say for the 
record on that point, it's appropriate to have a restitution hearing where both the amount 
of the restitution, or both the ability to pay as well as the circumstances of the restitution 
are appropriate. I think that that is within the scope of a restitution hearing. 
Restitution Hearing, R. 79, p. 10: 11-25; p.l 1: 1-16. Addendum "B." 
What the record in this case shows3 is that the defendant admitted to participating 
in a pyramid scheme. He did not agree to pay any restitution, much less $60,000 worth. 
Both the prosecutor and counsel for Mr. Poulsen agreed that $168,400 was the total loss 
that all of the victims suffered in the pyramid, but no one suggested or agreed that the 
victims suffered these losses at the hands of Mr. Poulsen. The court's order of restitution 
required the court to draw an inference that Mr. Poulsen not only participated in the 
pyramid, but that he actually caused the injury that gave rise to the loss by the victims of 
$168,400. There is nothing in the record which permits such an inference, and the trial 
court could not legally draw the inference based upon the facts in the record 
Two foundational cases support this conclusion. In State v. Lars en, 221 P.3d 277, 
3
 What is less clear from the record is the frustration shown by the court at any 
effort by Mr. Poulsen's counsel to turn the discussion from the defendant's ability to pay, 
to the facts and circumstances of how the victims lost their money. Implicit in the 
exchange between counsel and the court was the court's determination that if the victims 
lost $168,000, it was not going to permit a discussion of the relationship between the 
facts pled to, and the losses allegedly incurred. 
9 
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280 (Utah App. 2009), the defendant pled guilty to misdemeanor joy riding and unlawful 
possession of burglary tools. In a pre-sentence report, the defendant acknowledged that 
he and his friends "stole things that were not ours," and that "it was not only the car that 
we was taking, it was their life and maybe their job." Id. at 279. The trial court ordered 
restitution for repairs and towing costs associated with the restoration of the vehicle. Id. 
On appeal, the defendant argued that even though he admitted to stealing a car, the trial 
court had to have impermissibly drawn an inference that the theft was of this particular 
car, and the damage for which restitution was ordered was caused to this car. Id. at 280. 
The court of appeals reversed, stating that the statements in the sentencing report were 
too broad and that the trial court had incorrectly inferred that the damage to the car was 
the result of acts that defendant admitted. 
Similarly, in the case of State v. Watson, 987 P.2d 1289, 1290 (Utah App. 1999), 
the defendant pled guilty to attempted obstruction of justice when she sold the getaway 
car involved in a murder case. The trial court ordered her to pay restitution related to the 
death of the victim. The court of appeals stated that the only way the trial court could 
have connected the restitution order with the murder of the victim was to make inferences 
about the defendant's state of mind at the time of the murder. Id. at 1290. The court of 
appeals held that the trial court was forbidden from making any inferences about the 
crime, but rather the order of restitution was to be limited to the precise facts to which the 
defendant admitted in his or her plea. Id. at 1291. 
In the case at bar, Mr. Poulsen admitted nothing more or less then that he 
10 
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participated in a pyramid. He did not admit, and strenuously objected, to any inference 
the court may draw to the effect that Mr. Poulsen's participation in the pyramid enterprise 
resulted in the loss to these specific victims. As in the facts of Larsen, because Mr. 
Larsen admitted he stole a car, it did not follow—and the court could not assume—that 
he stole the particular car that was the subject of damage. 277 P. 2d Supra at 280. 
Similarly, here there were no facts in the record from which the court could draw even 
such basic factual predicates as that these particular victims ever spoke with Mr. Poulsen, 
that he made a representation to them, that he earned a fee from a transaction with the 
victims, or even that he was present when the victims lost their money. For all the court 
knows from the record before it, Mr. Poulsen may have placed his money with the 
victims (rather then them giving him money), who together lost it to third-persons. One 
camiot order repayment to all the victims of a scheme without knowing the fundamentals 
of what the scheme was, who participated in the alleged scheme, the defendant's role in 
the scheme, and the alleged representations arising therefrom. To order the restitution 
that was ordered under the circumstances of this case required not only simple 
impermissible inferences, but enormous leaps to legal and factual conclusions which 
cannot be found in the record. 
B. THERE IS NOT A SUFFICIENT LEGAL AND FACTUAL NEXUS 
BETWEEN THE FACT PLED TO AND THE RESTITUTION 
ORDERED. 
Closely related to the impermissible inferences made by the trial court in ordering 
the restitution in this case, is the lack of a nexus between the crime pled to and the 
11 
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restitution ordered. Admitting to participating in a pyramid enterprise could mean many 
things to many different people. The definition appearing in the criminal statute states 
that: 
"Pyramid scheme" means any sales device or plan under which a person gives 
consideration to another person in exchange for compensation or the right to 
receive compensation which is derived primarily from the introduction of other 
persons into the sales device or plan rather than from the sale of goods, services, or 
other property. U.C.A. § 76-6a-2(4). 
Webster defines a pyramid as a scheme "to speculate by using paper profits as 
margins for additional transactions." Based upon the foregoing, there are any number of 
actions which could be stretched to mean participating in a pyramid transaction. For 
example, being paid to drive to Idaho to purchase a lottery ticket for a friend could meet 
the definition of taking part in a pyramid. So too could being paid to try and win the 
proceeds of a Bingo game for one's blind grandmother. Similarly, soliciting persons for 
pay to participate in Amway, Shaekley, New Skin or dozens of other such multi-level 
marketing companies could also meets this definition. Even taking a commission for 
signing participants up in a raffle meets this broad definition of participating in a 
pyramid. 
The point is that there is no direct causal nexus between admitting to participating 
in such events, and third-parties actually losing large sums of money. Had Mr. Poulsen 
pled guilty to the sister statute of organizing, establishing, promoting or administering a 
pyramid scheme, the nexus between the crime admitted to and the restitution would be a 
12 
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much closer case. However, participating in such a transaction means nothing more than 
that the defendant took part in it with others. Such participatory conduct does not 
implicate a conclusion that Mr. Poulsen either directly caused a loss to a victim, or that 
he even communicated with or made a representation to a victim. Where the facts 
admitted to only encompass participating as opposed to promoting or administering, as a 
matter of law, the nexus is too attenuated and indirect to connect civil liability or criminal 
restitution thereto.4 
The liability distinction between promoting and participating is magnified when 
one considers that restitution should only be ordered where there is corresponding civil 
liability and a civil judgment could be invoked. Utah cases hold that there is a 
requirement that the actions complained of, for which restitution is provided, must be of a 
nature such that it meets the elements of a cause of action for civil damages. State v. 
Houston, 9 P.3d 188, 190 (Utah App. 2000). Such restitution damages are justified on a 
collateral-estoppel-type premise, in that whereas proof of guilt in the criminal context 
4
 Based upon the foregoing, there should be no remand in this case. The factual 
basis of the plea cannot change from being a participant hi a pyramid transaction. 
Therefore, as a matter of law, because participating in a pyramid does not and cannot rise 
to the level of directly causing losses to third persons, the restitution order should be 
vacated and the matter closed. State v. Houston, 9 P.3d 188, ft.nt. 3 (Utah App. 2000). 
(Vacating restitution and setting forth that the court may not look beyond the facts 
contained within the admission, and that the defendant would be entitled to a civil jury 
trial on any remaining fact questions bearing on liability); State v. Robinson, 860 P. 2d 
979 (Utah 1993). (Vacating restitution order because the crime may or may not have been 
the proximate cause of the victims losses, and thus, liability could not be established as a 
matter of law.) 
13 
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requires evidence beyond a reasonable doubt, such a burden standard necessarily meets 
the proof requirements for civil liability of a preponderance of evidence. 
To the extent that there is an undisclosed corresponding civil cause5 of action for 
participation in a pyramid scheme, it presumably would be some species of common law 
fraud. The elements that a party must allege "to bring a claim sounding in fraud" are (1) 
that a representation was made; (2) concerning a presently existing material fact (3) 
which was false and (4) which the representor either (a) knew to be false or (b) made 
recklessly, knowing that there was insufficient knowledge upon which to base such a 
representation, (5) for the purpose of inducing the other party to act upon it and (6) that 
the other party, acting reasonably and in ignorance of its falsity, (7) did in fact rely upon 
it (8) and was thereby induced to act (9) to that party's injury and damage. Gold 
Standard Inc. v. Getty Oil Co., 915 P.2d 1060, 1066-67 (Utah 1996). In order to 
determine if there is a "sufficient nexus" in the acts pled to and the victim's damages, 
"liability must be clear as a matter of law, and that the commission of the crime clearly 
establishes causality of the injury or the damages. " State v. Robinson, 860 P.2d 979, 983 
(Utah App. 1993). However, on the record before the court, none of these elements are 
present, much less established as a matter of law. The record would not support a civil 
theory of liability for fraud under a preponderance of the evidence standard, much less a 
* Further, there is no civil cause of action recognized in Utah for "participating" in 
a pyramid scheme. Because there is no common law cause of action for participating in a 
pyramid scheme, there can be no liability under the Restitution Act. State v. Houston, 9 
P.3d 188, 190 (Utah App. 2000). 
14 
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criminal beyond a reasonable doubt standard. Specifically, there is nothing in the record 
that unambiguously establishes a representation ofa presently existing fact. There 
certainly is nothing in the record from which one can infer the scienter requirement, of 
knowing the falsity of the representation, or of the victim's reliance on a representation. 
The record is simply too sparse, and the admission too ambiguous to comiect the dots in a 
civil case. In short, there is no record evidence that this defendant admitted criminal 
conduct resulting in pecuniary damages to these victims. LLC.A. § 76-3-201(4). There is 
only an acknowledgment that third party victims experienced the loss of $168,400 in a 
larger scheme, which is the same pyramid in which Mr. Poulsen lost his money. The 
most that can be said for what Mr. Poulsen admitted to is that he ambiguously 
acknowledged he was a participant in a pyramid, in which money was lost by third 
parties. As stated by counsel for Mr. Poulsen at the restitution hearing, if he had known 
that the system was going to assess $60,000 in restitution liability for his action of 
participating in a pyramid, he would have not taken the plea deal. Restitution Hearing, R. 
79, p. 6: 1-4, Addendum "B." 
The restitution ordered in this case also fails under a "but-for" analysis. A 
modified "but for" test requires: 1) that the damages "would not have occurred but for the 
conduct underlying the crime pled to; and, 2) that the causal nexus between the criminal 
conduct admitted to, and the loss not be too attenuated. State v. Harvell, 220 P.3d 174, 
177 (Utah App. 2009). (Restitution order requiring replacement of a brake system was 
15 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
too attenuated to the crime pled to of receipt of a stolen vehicle.) Neither the state nor 
Mr. Poulsen has placed anything into the record that would indicate that Mr. Poulsen's 
participation in a pyramid directly caused losses to these persons. Conceptually, if the 
victims and Mr, Poulsen lost money together to Mr. Bosch, they are all both victims and 
participants of the pyramid. Accordingly, one cannot say on the face of the matter that 
"but for" Mr. Poulsen's participation, these victims would not have lost money. 
Moreover, the state has not shown a causal connection between the admitted 
conduct and the losses allegedly suffered. A close examination of the record reveals that 
there was a stipulation in the record as to the amount people lost, but there was a direct 
and repeated objection to any suggestion that the losses were occasioned by this 
defendant. The record ends there, because the restitution hearing itself was limited by the 
court to a discussion of Mr. Poulsen's financial ability to pay. Any reference to causality 
was rebuffed by the trial court, who firmly concluded that the only purpose of the 
restitution hearing was to determine the defendant's ability to pay restitution. Under these 
circumstances, the facts admitted to are too attenuated to give rise to corresponding civil 
liability. As previously stated, the facts pled to for all the court knows could have arisen 
from a bingo game, a raffle, the purchase of lottery tickets, the creation of a down-line in 
a multilevel marketing venture, or other innocent activities which while technically 
meeting the definition of a pyramid, do not give rise to civil liability. The record is too 
sparse, the facts too elusive, the liability too attenuated, and the causation too conclusory 
16 
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for anyone to be able to establish that the participatory acts admitted to are the source of 
the putative injury. 
C. THE RESTITUTION ORDERED BY THE TRIAL COURT 
VIOLATES DUE PROCESS. 
The injustice to Mr. Poulsen was compounded by the nearly year-long bifurcation 
of the plea and sentencing phase of the case from the restitution hearing phase of the 
case. Utah Code Ann. § 77-38a-302(3) states that if the trial court determines that 
restitution is appropriate or inappropriate under this part, it shall make the reasons for the 
decisions part of the record" The court made no findings whatsoever indicating how Mr. 
Poulsen's participation in a pyramid cased injury in the amount of $168,000. Sub-part (4) 
states that: "If the defendant objects to the imposition, amount, or distribution of the 
restitution, the court shall allow the defendant a full hearing on the issue. " The 
defendant was denied even a cursory hearing . The hearing was long on financial ability-
to-pay matters, but short on how the victims came to lose money. Fmally, sub-part (5) of 
U.C.A. § 77-38a-302 sets forth factors the court should consider in making a restitution 
order, including the nature of the injury and loss to the victims. No such factors where 
heard or considered. The defendant is not sure if the passage of time between the 
hearings caused the disconnect. For example, perhaps the court made assumptions at the 
restitution hearing that causality had been established in the plea hearing, when it had not 
been so established. Or perhaps the court thought that since it had denied the motion to 
dismiss the restitution hearing, that matters of causality where matters of law and motion, 
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not requiring an evidentiary hearing. Whatever the reasons, Mr. Poulsen has never had a 
forum in which he could rebut the state's assertion that he injured third persons in such a 
way that he should be held financially responsible to them. 
In the case subjudice, although Mr. Poulsen objected to the claimed restitution, 
this court will search the record in vain for any evidentiary hearing in which the above 
factors were discussed. Specifically, although the court made findings about the financial 
ability of the defendant to pay, it expressly prohibited evidence of whether the defendant 
caused damage or loss to the victims. This is so even though at the plea stage, as can be 
seen from the record reconstructed above, it was made clear to the court and to the 
prosecutor that Mr. Poulsen's plea was only to being a participant in a pyramid 
transaction. Plea Hearing, R. 78, p. 4: 18-25. Addendum "A." Mr. Poulsen's counsel 
made clear that he was not agreeing with any restitution amounts. Id. at p. 10: 18-22; p. 
11: 1-16. The hearing took only minutes, and there was no evidentiary hearing conducted 
whatsoever. Plea Hearing, R. 78, pp. 1-11. Addendum "A." However, when the 
restitution hearing occurred nearly one year later, the court made clear that the only 
testimony he was going to permit at that hearing was related to the financial capacity of 
Mr. Poulsen. The court treated the hearing as though all of the factual predicates for 
finding civil liability were already a part of the record, when they were not. The court 
was expressly not interested in any of the circumstances that would bear on causality. 
Restitution Hearing, R. 79, p. 11: 1-22; p.4: 1-25; p. 5: 1-25; p. 6: 1-19. 
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In essence, Mr. Poulsen woke up one day to plead guilty to a misdemeanor charge 
of being a participant in a pyramid, for which he was fined $555. A year later, that 
simple plea to a misdemeanor was boot-strapped into a judgment of $60,000, the payment 
of which is enforceable by criminal sanctions. No one has identified for the record the 
legal theory by which civil liability would attach, nor are there any factual elements 
admitted to which would constitute a cause of action for civil liability. In short, on the 
record before the trial court, there is no court in the Country which would find civil 
liability in the amount of $60,000, much less make the failure to pay that sum a criminal 
offense. Yet all of that actually happened to this defendant in a court in Utah County. 
This case is factually similar to State v. Robinson, 860 P.2d 979 (Utah App. 
1993). In Robinson, the defendant pled guilty to making an improper lane change, which, 
as in the case at bar, constituted a Class B misdemeanor. As with the present case, in 
Robinson, the parties stipulated that medical expenses from the accident totaled 
$13,567.80. Further similar to the instant case, the trial court, without considering issues 
of proximate cause, affirmative defenses, or a release that the defendant and the victim 
had agreed to, entered a restitution order of $13,567.80 for medical expenses against the 
defendant. The court of appeals held that not having an opportunity to adjudicate such 
basic issues as proximate cause, affimiative defenses, and comparative fault, deprived the 
defendant of his property and violated the due process clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth 
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Amendments to the United States Constitution. Id. at 982-3.6 The court held that "issues 
of fault and proximate cause are crucial in determining damages in a civil case," and are 
"crucial in determining whether [the victims] have suffered pecuniary loss as a result of 
the defendant's criminal activities." Utah Code Ami. §76-3-201(4). Id at 983. Without 
some type of hearing in which these factors are presented and adjudicated, the defendant 
has been deprived of due process. Id1 
The Restitution Statute "requires that the responsibility for the criminal conduct be 
firmly established, much like a guilty plea, before the court can order restitution." State v. 
Watson, 987 P.2d 1289, 1290 (Utah App. 1999). Here, no such liability has been "firmly 
established." To make Mr. Poulsen chargeable for restitution that was neither admitted to 
in the plea, nor agreed to as part of the plea agreement, is to deprive him of due process. 
For these reasons, the restitution order should be vacated as a matter of law. 
X. CONCLUSION 
For the above reasons, Appellant, David Q. Poulsen, requests that the court vacate 
6
 The court also stated that imposing a restitution judgment without adjudicating 
causation not only violated due process, but probably violated the Open Courts provisions 
of the Utah Constitution, Article 1, Section 11, which guarantees access to the courts and 
the judicial procedure that is based upon fairness and equity. 
7
 The court also intimated that ordering restitution without a hearing on fault, 
proximate cause and affirmative defense, violates the open courts provisions of the Utah 
Constitution. 
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the order of restitution, and enter an order that any restitution paid8 in this case up to the 
date of this court's ruling be returned to Mr. Poulsen. 
77 
2^ day 
NELSON, SNUFFER, DAHLE & POULSEN, P.C. 
DATED this / Z   of September, 2011 
Attorney for Appellant, David Q. Poulsen 
8 Appellant Poulsen filed a motion to stay enforcement of the restitution order 
pending appeal, but the trial court denied the motion. 
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(May 11, 2010). 
MR. MARK POULSEN: Number 37, Your Honor? 
THE JUDGE: Okay. 
MS. 0'BRYANT: If I may approach, Your Honor. 
THE JUDGE: You may. 
MS. 0'BRYANT: We have an amended information. 
Counsel has already been provided a copy. 
THE JUDGE: Okay. You've been given a copy of 
the information. Do you waive a formal reading of the 
charge? 
MR. MARK POULSEN: Yes we do, Your Honor. 
THE JUDGE: We're here today for an initial 
appearance and we'll go ahead and schedule his waiver 
hearing. Is that what we are here for? 
MR. MARK POULSEN: I think we're here to plea. 
MS. 0'BRYANT: Enter a plea to the amended 
information. 
MR. MARK POULSEN: Enter a plea, Your Honor. 
THE JUDGE: Enter a plea today? Okay. Two 
Class B misdemeanors. I see. All right. 
MR. MARK POULSEN: Yes, Your Honor. W e — 
THE JUDGE: You've advised your client of his 
rights? 
MR. MARK POULSEN: I have. 
v&riT? A 
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THE JUDGE: And he understands the possible 
consequences of his plea, the rights that he's giving up or 
waiving, the possible sentence that could be imposed? Is 
that right, sir? 
DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. 
THE JUDGE: Do you understand? Have you had an 
adequate opportunity to talk to your lawyer about those 
things? 
DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. 
THE JUDGE: Are you prepared to waive your rights 
and enter a guilty plea to two Class B misdemeanors today? 
Is that the plea bargain or not? 
MS. 0'BRYANT: Yes, Your Honor. 
THE JUDGE: That is the plea bargain? 
MR. MARK POULSEN: Yes, Your Honor. 
THE JUDGE: May I have A factual basis to support 
the pleas? 
MS. 0*BRYANT: Yes, Your Honor. On or about 
about it looks like March 14th of 2008 and September 26th, 
2008 this individual solicited funds for a pyramid scheme, 
the total amount was a, $168,400. 
THE JUDGE: You've heard what's been stated. 
Are those the essential facts that you're admitting to to 
support the plea? 
MR. MARK POULSEN: Yes they are, Your Honor 
PAGE 5 
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ENTRY OF PLEA 
THE JUDGE: They are. Okay. To the charges as 
contained in Count 1 and Count 2, two Class B misdemeanors, 
operating a pyramid scheme, what are your pleas? 
MR. MARK POULSEN: Guilty, Your Honor. 
THE JUDGE: I'll receive and accept your guilty 
plea and proceed to sentencing at a time that you reguest. 
Do you want to be sentenced today or not? 
MS. O1BRYANT: Your Honor, I think we can do 
everything but the restitution today. We've, we've 
stipulated. We're recommending that the court order some 
community service and an appropriate fine for the Class B 
misdemeanor. And we're asking for a hearing in about 30 
days. We're going to try and come up with a stipulation as 
to the exact amount this individual is able to pay. 
THE JUDGE: How much community service are you 
recommending? 
MS. O'BRYANT: 60 hours. 
THE JUDGE: Is that, is that your understanding? 
MR. MARK POULSEN: That will work, Your Honor. 
THE JUDGE: All right. Anything you'd like to 
say in your own behalf, sir? 
MR. MARK POULSEN: There's something I'd like to 
say on his behalf if you don't mind. 
THE JUDGE: Go ahead. 
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MR. MARK POULSEN: This individual is an 
immigrant from Viet Nam. 
THE JUDGE: Uh-huh (affirmative). 
MR. MARK POULSEN: And a, he., although he's not 
illiterate he's a, very very unsophisticated. He was drawn 
into an investment scheme by his elders quorum president. 
He put all of his assets and life savings into that and a, 
lost it all. He was approached by his, two others about his 
a, his deals and told them about it and it resulted in these 
charges, Your Honor. 
He's an extremely unsophisticated person with no 
criminal background and no history whatsoever. He simply 
got caught up in an, in an investment fraud scheme that he 
was swept away in and again, lost all of his assets as a 
result of it. 
I, I would just urge the court's lenience on his 
behalf. A very, again, a very unsophisticated person for 
whom the law has just reached up and whacked in the side of 
the head. He doesn't quite understand it all but a, we'll 
accept the court's determination on it. 
THE JUDGE: Anything you'd like to say in your own 
behalf, sir? 
THE DEFENDANT: If I may. 
THE JUDGE: You may. 
PAGE 7 
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STATEMENT BY DEFENDANT POULSEN 
THE DEFENDANT: For the last 18 months my life 
have been changed dramatically from this event. And I don't 
ask the court to a, to be easy on me. I believe in 
responsibility. As a father of six children I teach them to 
do what is right. And because of this unfortunate, that we 
lost everything we have and we have to start over. At the 
same time I teach my children to stand up for and be 
accountable for the mistake they make. And this unfortunate 
mistake, I went through so much persecute at work and from 
what people read in the paper and a, of all these things. 
But the positive outcome came from it, I learned so much from 
it. I became a better father, better husband. And my eyes 
have opened from this and I'm grateful for that 
opportunity. 
And what I'm only asking you as a judge is that 
my children is everything to me, and that if I can retain 
my license to continue to work and support them and raise 
them and start our life over I will greatly appreciate it. 
And I'm sorry for all of this and if you can be 
understanding. 
THE JUDGE: Thank you, sir. Anything further 
from anyone? 
MR. MARK POULSEN: Nothing, Your Honor. 
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1 SENTENCE 
2 THE JUDGE: All right. It will be the judgment 
3 and the sentence of the court, Mr. Poulscn, that you serve 
4 six months in the county jail and pay $1,000 fine. I'll 
5 suspend the sentence this morning, place you on court 
6 probation for 12 months. Keep the court advised where you 
7 live during that time. Do not the violate the law. 
8 I'll order you serve 60 hours of community service 
9 and pay a minimum fine of $555 for both charges, that will 
10 include the 85% surcharge. So it will be a $300 fine and a 
11 255 surcharge is $555. Okay? 
12 Is there a court security fee on a Class B 
13 misdemeanor? I don't know, I don't think so. 
14 MR. MARK POULSEN: Do I understand you it's 500 
15 for both charges? 
16 THE JUDGE: Total. 
17 MR. MARK POULSEN: Total. 
18 THE JUDGE: Total. That will include both 
19 charges. 
20 MR. MARK POULSEN: Okay. 
21 THE JUDGE: One fine both Counts. 
22 All right. All right. Now we need a time 
23 certain since you're on court probation, there were no 
24 probation officer here, when this sentence will be 
25 completed. So when will he have his 60 hours completed and 
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pay the fine? You tell me and I'll more than likely go along 
with it but I expect it completed within that time period. 
Okay? ^. 
MS. O'BRYANT: Your Honor, we still need to set 
the restitution—. 
THE JUDGE: Yes. 
MS. O'BRYANT: — and I think it's going to 
probably take the entire 12 months to get everything taken 
care of. 
THE JUDGE: Should we just set a, do you have a 
number now? 
MS. O'BRYANT: Well, we have the total number of 
restitution. I don't think he has the ability to pay that. 
And that's what we wanted to discuss to see if we could come 
up with a stipulation as to court ordered probation. 
THE JUDGE: We'll probably put the order right 
now. What is the total number? 
MS. O'BRYANT: The total number is $168,400, o r — 
THE JUDGE: And you agreed to that, so we don't 
need a hearing on that? 
MR. MARK POULSEN: No, I don't agree that that's 
the proper amount. 
THE JUDGE: Okay. 
MR. MARK POULSEN: That is the amount that 
various people invested, but he didn't get that or any 
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approaching that so a — 
THE JUDGE: Well, then that's not the amount that 
he should pay if that's your position. 
MS. O'BRYANT: Right. That's, our position is 
not that that is the amount that— 
THE JUDGE: It's not a judgment— 
MS. O'BRYANT: — he should have to pay. 
THE JUDGE: — against him so. 
MS. O'BRYANT: That's the total loss. 
THE JUDGE: Okay. 
MS. O'BRYANT: What we need to discuss i s — 
THE JUDGE: How much he owes. 
MS. O'BRYANT: — what he has the ability to pay. 
I — 
THE JUDGE: Okay. We'll put it 60 days down for 
the state to submit a claim for restitution. <-•• 
MR. MARK POULSEN: Okay. 
THE JUDGE: And if it's not decided within that 
time we'll have a hearing. Okay? 
MR. MARK POULSEN: Okay. 
THE JUDGE: Now, the 60 hours of community service 
and the fine. 
MR. MARK POULSEN: Now the fine he can pay within 
a week. 
THE JUDGE: One week? Okay. 
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MR. MARK POULSEN: And the community service I 
would say 60 days. Are you okay with 60 days? 60 days, two 
months. 
THE JUDGE: That's the order then. Okay. Any 
questions? 
MR. MARK POULSEN: Thank you very much, 
Your Honor. 
THE JUDGE: Good luck. Good luck. 
WHEREUPON, the hearing was concluded. 
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(March 29, 2011) 
THE JUDGE: Which case are we ready on? 
MS. O'BRYANT: We're ready on David Poulsen, 
Your Honor. 
THE JUDGE: Okay. Number 57, David Poulsen. 
We're here for a restitution hearing. 
DISCUSSION BY MS. O'BRYANT 
MS. O'BRYANT: Your Honor, we have not been able 
to come to a resolution of this case. But we have agreed 
rather than have testimony to, to proffer the information to 
the court. 
The state filed a restitution request on June 15th 
of last year. It should be in the court's file. And that 
restitution request has the numbers that we would proffer to 
the court as being the full restitution that the state would 
request. Does the court have that? 
THE JUDGE: Full and complete restitution? 
Let me see if I can find that. The last pleading I have is 
January 31st. 
MS. O'BRYANT: Right. And on June, June 15th is 
when we filed our original request for restitution. 
THE JUDGE: Way back. Okay. 
MS. O'BRYANT: So it's going to be farther in the 
file. 
-n?\ r»i? 1 
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THE JUDGE: State's request for restitution, total 
of 168,400. 82,000 to Robert Clark and 86,000 to Michael 
Keith. Correct? 
MS. 0'BRYANT: That's correct, Your Honor. And 
attached to that are the supporting documents for that. 
THE JUDGE: Uh-huh (affirmative). 
MS. O'BRYANT: And I believe that the defense 
would stipulate that those are the numbers that are related 
to this case. 
THE JUDGE: Okay. All right. Let's hear from 
the state, your proffer first and then to defense. Or you've 
already made your proffer so— 
MS. O1BRYANT: That, that would be our proffer, 
Your Honor. 
THE JUDGE: That's your.... Okay. 
Okay. Mr. Poulsen? 
ARGUMENT BY MR. POULSEN 
MR. MARK POULSEN: Your Honor, may I approach? 
THE JUDGE: Yes. Uh-huh (affirmative). 
MR. MARK POULSEN: I think to be clear, 
Your Honor, we would stipulate that the, the dollar figures 
that you see there are amounts that victims put into this. 
I, I reiterate that there has to be a nexus 
between the allegations pled to, which is participating in a 
pyramid scheme, and the restitution in this case. And I 
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don't believe that that 168 represents a nexus in any way, 
shape or form to, to the injury— 
THE JUDGE: That's the argument you made to me 
that I denied though, isn't it? 
MR. MARK POULSEN: I'm not sure if that's, if 
that's what the basis of your denial was, Your Honor. I'm 
not sure— 
THE JUDGE: That was the basis— 
MR. MARK POULSEN: — if that's what you said. 
THE JUDGE: — of your case though, wasn't it? 
MR. MARK POULSEN: My request was to dismiss the 
hearing. 
THE JUDGE: Yes. 
MR. MARK POULSEN: I think the court can still 
have a hearing but still make a decision as to the 
appropriateness of the relationship between the a... 
We DON'T concede though those victims lost that at 
the hands of this person. There's no facts in the record to 
support that, Your Honor. Any facts would be hearsay to 
that effect. 
We pled very simply to participating in pyramid 
scheme. I asked the court in all earnest that the 
restitution order be tied to only those facts. Otherwise we 
wouldn't have pled to them, Your Honor. 
I would say further, had we known that we were 
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going to be facing $168,000 restitution I would rather take, 
try the case and have the offense, you know, dealt with in a 
full and fair hearing than plead to participating in a 
pyramid scheme and still face a $168,000 payback. 
THE JUDGE: Well, if he had been found guilty you 
would still be faced with the same consequence. They would 
be asking for restitution for this amount. 
MR. MARK POULSEN: They would be, and then, and 
again— 
THE JUDGE: We would be right here today whether 
you pled guilty or found guilty. 
MR. MARK POULSEN: But we'd probably only do it 
to a pyramid scheme, Your Honor. That's different than 
sticking somebody up for 168,000. They are not the same. 
And there's not A nexus between those two, it's very very 
crucial. 
These people all put their money together into a, 
pyramid scheme with, and Mr. Bosch (phonetic) who has been 
indicted by the state— 
THE JUDGE: Okay. S o — 
MR. MARK POULSEN: They were all victims and lost 
on that together. 
THE JUDGE: I don't mean to cut you off. But I, I 
appreciate that argument. 
MR. MARK POULSEN: Okay. 
PAGE 6 
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THE JUDGE: It's a good one and it has some 
persuasive weight to it. I just decline to adopt it and 
disagree. 
So we are here today to determine the amount, 
you've stipulated to the amount. If you have something to 
say, you'd like to present to me as to what the amount ought 
to be for the court. 
MR. MARK POULSEN: Yes I do, Your Honor. 
The, the tax statements I have here shows that the 
victim, that the, the victim, the, the defendant in the last 
two years has had an income of $100,000, 99 and 101 I think 
so— 
THE JUDGE: Each year? 
MR. MARK POULSEN: Each year. 
THE JUDGE: All right. 
MR. MARK POULSEN: That represents a, we're 
proffering, Your Honor, that represents his effort to dig 
out of the financial hole by working two jobs. He is an 
X-ray technician for Intermountain Health and a, and for 
Payson hospital. And he works two jobs. And I think it's 
between 20 and $25 an hour is what that would net out to 
as a wage. Works, you know, more than a, 70, 80 hours a 
week. 
He has six children. One is about to leave to 
college, another is about to leave on a mission, various 
PAGE 7 
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stages of high school and junior high and elementary. 
He doesn't own a house. And he owns two old 
dilapidated cars. Lives in an apartment and a, is a... 
Again, I would represent to the court that his 
expenses are approximately equivalent to his income. He 
pays tithing and his other charitable contributions. And a, 
that again he, he has a, a very little disposable income at 
the end of, of that. 
He's here in open court, Your Honor, you'd be free 
to ask him questions. This is by proffer and that's what I 
would proffer to you. 
THE JUDGE: Okay. 
MR. MARK POULSEN: But that a, I think that 
he could realistically do debt service a $10,000 obligation 
over a period of, you know, perhaps three years. And a, 
that that would be, that's reasonable under the 
circumstances. 
We're unable to, as the unusual circumstance of 
being a, a small Class B misdemeanor with a very large a, 
restitution amount in it, theoretically. 
But again, I would ask the court to, to not 
indenture this person for, for years of his life in paying 
back an obligation, which he's already paid, lost $300,000 
himself and a, has done everything in his power to support 
his family and dig out of the hole that he's in. 
n n n r i O 
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THE JUDGE: Okay. Thank you. 
MR. MARK POULSEN: Thank you, Your Honor. 
THE JUDGE: State's response? 
FURTHER ARGUMENT BY MS. O'BRYANT 
MS. 01BRYANT: If I could have just a moment to, 
to verify the accuracy. 
Your Honor, I don't know if you want this marked as 
an exhibit or if I could simply submit this as part of the 
restitution. 
MR. MARK POULSEN: I have no objection. 
MS. 0fBRYANT: Okay. If we could have this 
marked. This is from the bankruptcy court. Mr. Poulsen 
filed bankruptcy in 2009. It's marked as state's EXHIBIT #1 
and they have accepted the accuracy of this. 
I would call the court's attention to the average 
expenses incurred, monthly income. There's $1,000 difference 
there in the positive, which would seem to indicate that even 
after all of his monthly expenses he could afford $1,000 a 
month payments. 
THE JUDGE: This was dated when? 
MS. O1BRYANT: That's I believe January of 
2009. 
THE JUDGE: What are the circumstances now? 
MS. O1BRYANT: My understanding is the total 
income that he's making is the same or greater than it was at 
DnnTT' Q 
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THE JUDGE: Do you want to respond to this? 
FURTHER ARGUMENT BY MR. POULSEN 
MR. MARK POULSEN: Yes. My only response, 
Your Honor, would be that the circumstances of a, of raising 
a family and paying, the children going to college and those 
circumstances have, have evaporated whatever additional 
income might be represented by that, or so-called disposable 
income. Just the needs of a growing family, Your Honor, are 
overwhelming in that sense. 
« 
THE JUDGE: Okay. So let's make sure that 
you're both a, representing to me the standard of review for 
the court here today. You both stipulate and agree that the 
real purpose of the hearing is to determine not the amount of 
restitution, that's been fixed and is full and complete at 
the 168,400. Right? But the order should be based on his 
ability to pay. Correct? 
MS. OfBRYANT: Yes, Your Honor. 
THE JUDGE: Do you agree with that? 
MR. MARK POULSEN: I do agree with that. 
THE JUDGE: And what you've presented to me is 
the only evidence that I have before me to determine his 
ability to pay. Correct? 
MR. MARK POULSEN: Yes. As well as 
appropriateness. If I could state for the record, as well 
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as the appropriateness of the payment in the nexus to the 
crime is, I believe, a proper standard for the court to 
follow. 
THE JUDGE: I'm not quite sure. You keep arguing 
that to me and I'm not sure I understand it. Because that 
was before me before and I, I think I denied that, that 
argument that you have made that there should be a 
restitution that, no restitution in this case because it's 
not appropriate to the crime that he committed. 
MR. MARK POULSEN: And the only thing again I 
would like to say for the record on that point, it's 
appropriate to have a restitution hearing where both the 
amount of the restitution, or both the ability to pay as 
well as the circumstances of the restitution are 
appropriate. I think that that is within the scope of a 
restitution hearing. 
THE JUDGE: Ms. Baldwin do you have, 0'Bryant, do 
you have anything to respond to that? 
MS. O'BRYANT: Your Honor, I think the court has 
ruled on whether restitution is appropriate in the case. 
It's just simply the amount that needs to be addressed here 
today 
COURT'S RULING 
THE JUDGE: Thank you. Okay. 
Well, I have considered that he's working two jobs 
•D n nx? 1 1 
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and is an X-ray technician, he makes $25 an hour. He has six 
children. He lives in an apartment. He has no home. He 
drives old cars. 
That he has had income in the past two years of 
99,000 and $100,000 each year which is substantial income. 
I do appreciate and find that he has little disposable income 
but that there was a bankruptcy where he was verifying to the 
bankruptcy court he had $1,000 a month disposable income back 
in January of 2009. 
I appreciate that his expenses have gone up with 
college and other things towards his family. But 
restitution is an important component in this, in this case. 
And a, some of the other luxuries of, of college educations 
and things like that for his children, as important as that 
is, and I don't mean to diminish that, it seems to me to be 
a, something that he has the ability to forego, and that the 
victims in this case should be paid before that takes place. 
And there's an, obviously that seems to me to be an extra 
income for him. 
So I think that a restitution order in this case 
from 168 ought to be a, 60,000, 30,000 to each victim, and 
that he has the ability to pay $1,000 a month, 500 to each of 
those victims for five years until that's paid in full. 
Okay? 
MR. MARK POULSEN: Thank you, Your Honor. 
T> 7\ r>T? 1 O 
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THE JUDGE: Anything further? That's the 
parameters of what you presented to me. 
Is that right, Ms. 0'Bryant? 
MS. O'BRYANT: It is correct, Your Honor. 
THE JUDGE: Mr. Poulsen? Anything else that I'm 
missing here that that's what you wanted me to determine 
based on the law and the facts that I have before me? 
MR. MARK POULSEN: The defendant was saying he 
can't work two jobs for five more years, he just doesn't 
think he has the physical capacity for that. 
THE JUDGE: Well he's, he's got a, he's got tax 
returns and income of $100,000 a year. And so I do not see 
in any way, shape or form that I have a poverty case before 
me here. And something is going to have to change in his 
life-style to make sure that he maybe cuts back on a few 
things and that this restitution is paid. 
If his income was less than that, counsel, I'd be 
more sympathetic with your case. But that's a substantial 
income in this economy, many people are making far less than 
that. So that was the most persuasive piece of evidence in 
favor of the state in my view and justified the, especially 
in light of the fact that his bankruptcy listed he had 
$6,000 a month and $5,000 a month in expenses. 
If he has disposable income he wants to place for 
his children's college, that's great. But there are other 
•nv A r*T? 1 ^ 
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1 ways to do that, student loans, and children can work. 
2 These victims need to be paid. I have reduced it 
3 substantially from what was ordered in this case, what was 
4 presented to me I should say in this case, based on his 
5 ability today. But clearly with the facts before me today 
6 he has that excess income, that income to pay this amount and 
7 for this period of time to these victims. 
8 Thank you 
9 MR. MARK POULSEN: Thank you, Your Honor, 
10 THE JUDGE: Uh-huh (affirmative) 
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STATE OF UTAH 





I, Penny C. Abbott, a Certified Shorthand Reporter and 
Notary Public in and for the State of Utah, do hereby certify 
that I received the electronically recorded proceedings in 
the matter of State vs. Poulsen, hearing date March 29, 2011, 
and that I transcribed it into typewriting and that a full, 
true and correct transcription of said hearing so recorded 
and transcribed is set forth in the foregoing pages numbered 
1 through 14, inclusive, including where it is indicated that 
the recording was inaudible. 
I further certify that I am not of kin nor otherwise 
associated with any of the parties to this cause of action 
and am not interested in the event thereof. 
WITNESS my hand and official seal this 5th day of May, 
2011 . 
PENNY C. iBEtorYT CO'URT REPORTER/NOTARY 
Licens«L22-1 02811-7801 
Notary Public, Comm Exp 9-24-12 
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4TH DISTRICT COURT - PROVO 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
DAVID Q POULSEN, 
Defendant 
TTTTTTTTlTnTTrrurTTn 
' <-TATE OF UlAh 
MINUTES ' t ' f-P rr.lJrlTY 
RESTITUTION HEARfNG" ~ ^ ' 
JMENT, COMMITMENT 
201! MAft 30 A b-7j^v 
Case No: 101401180 FS 
Judge: STEVEN L. HANSEN 




Prosecutor: OBRYANT, MARIANE B 
Defendant 
Defendant's Attorney(s): POULSEN, MARK L 
DEFENDANT INFORMATION 
Date of birth: December 16, 1969 
Audio 
Tape Number: 11-2 03 Tape Count: 10:47 
CHARGES 
1. PYRAMID SCHEME 
Plea: Guilty 
2. PYRAMID SCHEME 
Plea: Guilty 
HEARING 
• Class B Misdemeanor 
- Disposition: 05/11/2010 Guilty 
• Class B Misdemeanor 
- Disposition: 05/11/2010 Guilty 
TAPE: 11-203 COUNT: 10:47 
This matter comes before the court for a restitution hearing. 
Mrs. OrBryant proffers testimony. Mr. Poulsen proffers testimony. 
Mr. Poulsen stipulates to the dollar amounts the victims have 
invested. Mrs. 0'Bryant responds. The court orders restitution in 
the amount of $60,000.00. 
The court orders $30,000.00 to be paid to Robert Clark and 
$30,000.00 to be paid to Michael Keith. 
SENTENCE JAIL 
Based on the defendant's conviction of PYRAMID SCHEME-a Class B 
Misdemeanor, the defendant is sentenced to a term of 180 day(s) 
The total time suspended for this charge is 180 day(s). 
Based on the defendant's conviction of PYRAMID SCHEME a Class B 
Misdemeanor, the defendant is sentenced to a term of 180 day(s) 
The total time suspended for this charge is 180 day(s). 
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Complete 6 0 hour(s) of community service. 
Restitution Amount: $30000.00 Plus Interest 
Pay in behalf of: ROBERT CLARK 
Restitution 
Pay in behalf 
Amount: $30000.00 
of: MICHAEL KEITH 
SCHEDULED TIMEPAY 
The following cases are on timepay 101401180. 
The defendant is to pay $1000.00 monthly on the 29th. 
The number of payments scheduled is 63 plus a final payment of 
$748.75. 
The first payment is due on 4/29/2011 the final payment of $748.75 
is due on 07/29/2016. The final payment ma^ vary based on 
interest . s ! I- £ , J ,<^^ 
Date 3 ^vn 
y. 
STEVEN L. HANSEN \ r:t 
District Court Judged 
;
 -TV 
STAMP USED AT DtRECT 
in 
o 
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ADDENDUM "C 
MEMORANDUM SUPPORT MOTION TO DISMISS 
RESTITUTION HEARING 
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Mark L. Poulsen (5424) 
NELSON, SNUFFER, DAHLE 
10885 South State Street 
Sandy, Utah 84070 
Telephone: (801) 576-1400 
Facsimile: (801) 576-1960 
Attorney for Defendant 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
PROVO DEPARTMENT 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
V . 
DAVID Q. POULSEN, 
Defendant. 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
REQUEST FOR DISMISSAL OF 
RESTITUTION HEARING 
Case No. 101401180 
Judge Steven L. Hansen 
Defendant, David Q. Poulsen, (the "defendant") by and through his attorney of record, 
Mark L. Poulsen of the law firm of Nelson, Snuffer, Dahle & Poulsen, P.C., hereby submits this 
memorandum in support of motion to dismiss the State of Utah's (the "State") requests for 
restitution. The grounds for this request for dismissal are as follows: 
1. The State of Utah Lacks Subject Matter Jurisdiction and Standing to Request 
Restitution from the Defendant. 
Utah Code Ann § 77-38a-202 states that: 
(1) At the time of entry of a conviction or entry of any plea disposition of a felony 
or class A misdemeanor, the attorney general, county attorney, municipal attorney, 
or district attorney shall provide to the district court: (a) the names of all victims, 
ZQ\0 S ;PP H p 2- 38 
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including third parties, asserting claims for restitution; (b) the actual or estimated 
amount of restitution determined at that time; [emphasis added]. 
The forgoing statute authorizes and directs the Distnct Attorney to bring a restitution 
action in cases involving the conviction or entry of plea by a defendant involving a felony or a 
Class A misdemeanor. However, the plea by the defendant in the case at bar was to a Class B 
misdemeanor, not a Class A misdemeanor, or to a felony. The Distnct Attorney derives its 
authority from the legislature, but the legislature has stated by inference that it does not want the 
District Attorney in the business of seeking restitution through the district Court for small 
offenses, or those offences under the Class A variety. The Distnct Attorney's Office lacks the 
statutory authorization and standing to bring an action for restitution against the defendant for an 
offence below a class A misdemeanor. 
Moreover, this court lacks subject matter junsdiction to order restitution in a case 
involving a Class B. Misdemeanor. The legislature has simply limited the authority of the state to 
bnng restitution actions to cases involving misdemeanors and above, but has not authorized such 
actions for simple Class B and C misdemeanors. State v. Ferguson, 28 P.2d . 175 (Utah 1934) 
( District Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction of a matter involving the prosecution of a 
misdemeanor). Based on the lack of statutory authorization for the Distnct Attorney to bnng this 
action, and the lack of subject matter jurisdiction for this court to hear such an action, defendant 
request that the restitution hearing be dismissed. 
B. Because There Is No Civil Action Available for the Cnme of Participating in a 
Pyramid Scheme, Ordering Restitution Against this Defendant Is Improper. 
2 
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Utah Code Ann.§ 76-3-201(1)© states that: 
Pecuniary damages" means all special damages, but not general damages, which a 
person could recover against the defendant in a civil action arising out of the 
facts or events constituting the defendant's criminal activities and includes the 
money equivalent of property taken, destroyed, broken, or otherwise harmed, and 
losses including earnings and medical expenses. (Emphasis Added) 
Based upon the forgoing restitution statute, as a prerequisite to amy restitution order, the 
crime pled to must be of a nature such that it would allow for a remedy under civil law. Under 
the express requirements of the statute, if the crime alleged to have been committed is not 
compensable civilly, or if it is a crime in which there is not a pecuniary loss directly attributable 
to the defendant, a restitution order is improper. 
In the instant case, the defendant pled guilty to a Class B misdemeanor consisting of 
being a participant in a pyramid scheme under Utah Code Ann. § 76-6a-4(2). Nothing more. 
However, there is no cause of action that is recognized in Utah for participating in (as opposed to 
promoting) a pyramid scheme. Utah law does not recognize a cause of action for merely being a 
participant in a multi-level scheme. Without an underlying theory of civil liability for the 
misdemeanor committed, no right of restitution exists under the restitution statute. State v. 
Houston, 9 P.3d 188, (Utah App. 2000)( Before restitution can be ordered, it must be shown that 
the acts constituting the cnnie are also compensable in a civil action). Further, any cause of 
action for restitution must be completely established by the conviction or admission of the 
defendant. Id. State v. Robinson, 860 P.2d 979, 983 (Utah App. 1993). (Restitution should only 
3 
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be ordered where the crime admitted to clearly establishes causality to the injury or loss). Being 
a participant in a pyramid scheme, without any representations, statements, reliance, or promises, 
to any third-party victims, can not, without more, constitute the elements necessary to form the 
basis of a civil action. The defendant's plea to being a participant in a pyramid scheme does not 
rise to the level of an admission that he wrongfully caused an injury or a pecuniary loss to a 
victim. There is no admission before the court of any action which gave rise to a compensable 
injury to a third party, nor does Utah recognize a cause of action for participating in a pyramid 
scheme. Without such an admission, there is no right of restitution, and the hearing for 
restitution should be dismissed. 
C. There Is No Causal Connection Between the Conduct Admitted to by the Defendant, 
and the Injury or Loss of the Victims. 
Closely related to the argument that there is no civil liability associated with participating 
ain a pyramid scheme, is the defendant's contention that there is not a causal connection to the 
cnme admitted to by him, and the injury or loss for which restitution is sought by the State. For 
example, in State v. Watson, 987 P.2d 1289 (Utah App. 1999), a court ordered restitution to the a 
family of a murder victim. However, her plea bargain was for obstructing justice. Because there 
was no link between her admission to obstructing justice, and the death of a victim, the court of 
appeals held that a restitution order was improper. Other court decisions that have reached the 
same result include: State v. Robinson, 860 P.2d 979,983 (Utah App. 1993)(There must be close 
4 
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causality to the crime confessed to, and the injury for which restitution is sought); State v. 
Harvell, 220 P.2d 174 (Utah App. 2009)( Defendant who was convicted of receiving stolen 
property could not be ordered to pay restitution to the victims of a burglary, as there was no 
causal connection between the burglary, and the receipt of stolen property for which the 
defendant was convicted); State v. Larsen, 221 P.23d 277 (Utah App. 2009).( Plea of the 
misdemeanor charge of joyriding would not support a restitution order for the repair of a 
damaged car). 
Any causality between the defendant's acts and the injury to the victims would necessarily 
require a showing of some action involving scienter, fraudulent mental intent, or 
misrepresentation. However, participating in a pyramid scheme does not intrinsically, or 
inherently involve even so much as a representation, much less a fraudulent one. Without such 
an admission by this defendant, the State can not meet the causality requirements to obtain an 
order of restitution. 
D. Even If There Was Causality BetAveen Defendant's Admission, and the Restitution 
Sought, Those Parties for Whom Restitution Is Sought Do Not Meet the Definition of "Victims 
under the Restitution Statute. 
Even if the court were to look behind the actual plea bargain in the case at bar, (a step 
prohibited by the case law) to try and understand what is being alleged by way of restitution, 
these putative victims do not meet the definition of "victims" under the statute. Utah Code Ann. 
§(14)(a) states that the term: "Victim" means any person whom the court determines has suffered 
5 
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pecuniary damages as a result of the defendant's cnminal activities. [A] "victim" may not include 
a codefendant or accomplice. 
In the instant case, the best that can be said for the state's restitution claim, is that the 
defendant was a participant in a pyramid scheme, and that he invited or induced others to also so 
participate in the multi-level scheme. That would, by definition, and by operation or law, mean 
that the other parties like the defendant against whom restitution is sought - were also 
participants in a multi-level pyramid scheme. Under such circumstances, the restitution statute 
prohibits recovery from another participant in the same alleged bad acts. 
E. The Restitution Sought by the State Is in the Nature of General Damages, Not Special 
Damages, Yet the Restitution Statute Only Permits the Recovery of Special Damages. 
Utah Code Ann. § states that: 
Pecuniary damages'* means all special damages, but not general damages, which 
a person could recover against the defendant in a civil action arising out of the 
facts or events constituting the defendant's cnminal activities and includes the 
money equivalent of property taken, destroyed, broken, or otherwise harmed, and 
losses including earnings and medical expenses. 
It is obvious on the face of what is being claimed by the state that the damages sought are 
in the nature of general damages, not special damages. Claims for return of funds placed into an 
investment scheme do not fit the definition of "special damages," but rather are in the nature of 
general damages. Based upon the plain reading fo the statute, such damages can not be claimed 
as part of a restitution order. Accordingly, defendant requests the restitution hearing be 
dismissed, and that the proceedings in this matter be closed. 
6 
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CONCLUSION 
Because the State lacks standing to seek restitution and the court lacks subject matter 
jurisdiction to order restitution, defendant requests the hearing on restitution be dismissed with 
prejudice. Further, because there is no civil recovery for the crime admitted to by defendant, and 
the there is no causal connection to the crime pled to by defendant, and the losses of the alleged 
victims, restitution is improper in this case. Fmally the putative victims in this matter do not fit 
the definition of "victims" under the restitution statute, and they are seeking general damages 
from this defendant, which are not permitted under the statute. Accordingly, the action for 
restitution should be dismissed with prejudice. 
DATED this ptember, 2010. 
NELSON, SNUFFER, DAHLE & POULSEN, P.C. 
b^J Marl^L. Poulsef 
Attorney for Defendant David Q. Poulsen 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this j{_^ day of September, 2010,1 served on the following a 
true and correct copy of the foregoing REQUEST DISMISSAL OF RESTITUTION 
HEARING via prepaid United States Postal Service First-Class Mail. 
Mariane B. O'Bryant 
Utah County Attorney's Office 
100 East Center Street, Suite 2100 
Provo, UT 84606 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 




Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
ADDENDUM "D 
ORDER DENYING REQUEST TO DISMISS 
RESTITUTION HEARING 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
4TH DISTRICT COURT - PROVO 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
P l a i n t i f f , 
v s . 
DAVID Q POULSEN, 
D e f e n d a n t . 
RULING STATE or - ? ^ -
- V 
Case No: 1 0 1 4 0 1 1 8 0 
J u d g e : STEVEN L . HANSEN 
D a t e : M a r c h 4 , 2 011 
F o r t h e r e a s o n s s e t f o r t h b y t h e S t a t e , a n d f o r good c a u s e 
a p p e a r i n g , t h e m o t i o n t o d i s m i s s t h e r e s t i t u t i o n h e a r i n g i s h e r e b y 
d e n i e d . 
D a t e : iM 
teyi!** 
'IL 
Page 1 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Case No: 101401180 Date: Mar 04, 2011 
CERTIFICATE OF NOTIFICATION 
I certify that a copy of the attached document was sent to the 
following people for case 1014 0118 0 by the method and on the date 
specified. 
MAIL: MARK L POULSEN 10885 S STATE ST SANDY, UT 84070 
BY HAND: STATE OF UTAH 
Date: 3"MMI T 1- M^^\ • 
Deputy Court Clerk 
Page 2 (last) Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TabE 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
ADDENDUM "E" 
DETERMINATIVE LAW 
1. AMENDMENTS 5 & 14, UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 
2. ARTICLE I, SECTION 11, UTAH CONSTITUTION (OPEN COURTS 
PROVISION) 
3. UTAH CODE ANNOTATED § 76-3-201(4); § 76-6a-2(4); § 76-6a-4(2); 
§ 77-38a-302; § 78A-4-103(l)(e) 
4. RULE 3, UTAH RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 
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1. 
AMENDMENTS 5 & 14, UNITED STATES 
CONSTITUTION 
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AMENDMENT V, UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a 
presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval 
forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or public danger; nor shall 
any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor 
shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of 
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken 
for public use, without just compensation. 
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AMENDMENT XIV, UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 
Passed by Congress June 13, 1866. Ratified July 9, 1868. 
Note: Article I, section 2, of the Constitution was modified by section 2 of the 14th 
amendment. 
Section 1. 
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction 
thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State 
shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens 
of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, 
without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal 
protection of the laws. 
Section 2. 
Representatives shall be apportioned among the several States according to their 
respective numbers, counting the whole number of persons in each State, excluding 
Indians not taxed. But when the right to vote at any election for the choice of electors for 
President and Vice-President of the United States, Representatives in Congress, the 
Executive and Judicial officers of a State, or the members of the Legislature thereof, is 
denied to any of the male inhabitants of such State, being twenty-one years of age,* and 
citizens of the United States, or in any way abridged, except for participation in rebellion, 
or other crime, the basis of representation therein shall be reduced in the proportion which 
the number of such male citizens shall bear to the whole number of male citizens 
twenty-one years of age in such State. 
Section 3. 
No person shall be a Senator or Representative in Congress, or elector of President and 
Vice-President, or hold any office, civil or military, under the United States, or under any 
State, who, having previously taken an oath, as a member of Congress, or as an officer of 
the United States, or as a member of any State legislature, or as an executive or judicial 
officer of any State, to support the Constitution of the United States, shall have engaged 
in insurrection or rebellion against the same, or given aid or comfort to the enemies 
thereof. But Congress may by a vote of two-thirds of each House, remove such disability. 
Section 4. 
The validity of the public debt of the United States, authorized by law, including debts 
incurred for payment of pensions and bounties for services in suppressing insurrection or 
rebellion, shall not be questioned. But neither the United States nor any State shall 
assume or pay any debt or obligation incurred in aid of insurrection or rebellion against 
the United States, or any claim for the loss or emancipation of any slave; but all such 
debts, obligations and claims shall be held illegal and void. 
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Section 5. 
The Congress shall have the power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions 
of this article. 
*Changed by section 1 of the 26th amendment. 
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2. 
ARTICLE I, SECTION 11, UTAH CONSTITUTION 
(OPEN COURTS PROVISION) 
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Article I, Section 11. [Courts open — Redress of injuries.] 
All courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury done to him in his person, 
property or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law, which shall be 
administered without denial or unnecessary delay; and no person shall be barred from 
prosecuting or defending before any tribunal in this State, by himself or counsel, any civil 
cause to which he is a party. 
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3. 
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED § 76-3-201(4); 
§ 76-6a-2(4); § 76-6a-4(2); § 77-38a-302; 
§ 78A-4-103(l)(e) 
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76-3-201. Definitions ~ Sentences or combination of sentences allowed — 
Civil penalties. 
(1) As used in this section: 
(a) "Conviction" includes a: 
(i) judgment of guilt; and 
(ii) plea of guilty. 
(b) "Criminal activities" means any offense of which the defendant is convicted or 
any other criminal conduct for which the defendant admits responsibility to the sentencing 
court with or without an admission of committing the criminal conduct. 
(c) "Pecuniary damages" means all special damages, but not general damages, 
which a person could recover against the defendant in a civil action arising out of the 
facts or events constituting the defendant's criminal activities and includes the money 
equivalent of property taken, destroyed, broken, or otherwise harmed, and losses 
including earnings and medical expenses. 
(d) "Restitution" means full, partial, or nominal payment for pecuniary damages to 
a victim, and payment for expenses to a governmental entity for extradition or 
transportation and as further defined in Title 77, Chapter 38a, Crime Victims Restitution 
Act. 
(e) (i) "Victim" means any person who the court determines has suffered 
pecuniary damages as a result of the defendant's criminal activities. 
(ii) "Victim" does not include any coparticipant in the defendant's criminal 
activities. 
(2) Within the limits prescribed by this chapter, a court may sentence a person 
convicted of an offense to any one of the following sentences or combination of them: 
(a) to pay a fine; 
(b) to removal or disqualification from public or private office; 
(c) to probation unless otherwise specifically provided by law; 
(d) to imprisonment; 
(e) on or after April 27, 1992, to life in prison without parole; or 
(f) to death. 
(3) (a) This chapter does not deprive a court of authority conferred by law to: 
(i) forfeit property; 
(ii) dissolve a corporation; 
(iii) suspend or cancel a license; 
(iv) permit removal of a person from office; 
(v) cite for contempt; or 
(vi) impose any other civil penalty. 
(b) A civil penalty may be included in a sentence. 
(4) (a) When a person is convicted of criminal activity that has resulted in 
pecuniary damages, in addition to any other sentence it may impose, the court shall order 
that the defendant make restitution to the victims, or for conduct for which the defendant 
has agreed to make restitution as part of a plea agreement. 
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(b) In determining whether restitution is appropriate, the court shall follow the 
criteria and procedures as provided in Title 77, Chapter 38a, Crime Victims Restitution 
Act. 
(c) In addition to any other sentence the court may impose, the court, pursuant to 
the provisions of Sections 63M-7-503 and 77-38a-401, shall enter: 
(i) a civil judgment for complete restitution for the full amount of expenses paid 
on behalf of the victim by the Utah Office for Victims of Crime; and 
(ii) an order of restitution for restitution payable to the Utah Office for Victims of 
Crime in the same amount unless otherwise ordered by the court pursuant to Subsection 
(4)(d). 
(d) In determining whether to order that the restitution required under Subsection 
(4)(c) be reduced or that the defendant be exempted from the restitution, the court shall 
consider the criteria under Subsections 77-38a-302(5)(c)(i) through (iv) and provide 
findings of its decision on the record. 
(5) (a) In addition to any other sentence the court may impose, and unless 
otherwise ordered by the court, the defendant shall pay restitution of governmental 
transportation expenses if the defendant was: 
(i) transported pursuant to court order from one county to another within the state 
at governmental expense to resolve pending criminal charges; 
(ii) charged with a felony or a class A, B, or C misdemeanor; and 
(iii) convicted of a crime. 
(b) The court may not order the defendant to pay restitution of governmental 
transportation expenses if any of the following apply: 
(i) the defendant is charged with an infraction or on a subsequent failure to appear 
a warrant is issued for an infraction; or 
(ii) the defendant was not transported pursuant to a court order. 
(c) (i) Restitution of governmental transportation expenses under Subsection 
(5)(a)(i) shall be calculated according to the following schedule: 
(A) $100 for up to 100 miles a defendant is transported; 
(B) $200 for 100 up to 200 miles a defendant is transported; and 
(C) $350 for 200 miles or more a defendant is transported. 
(ii) The schedule of restitution under Subsection (5)(c)(i) applies to each 
defendant transported regardless of the number of defendants actually transported in a 
single trip. 
(d) If a defendant has been extradited to this state under Title 77, Chapter 30, 
Extradition, to resolve pending criminal charges and is convicted of criminal activity in 
the county to which he has been returned, the court may, in addition to any other sentence 
it may impose, order that the defendant make restitution for costs expended by any 
governmental entity for the extradition. 
(6) (a) In addition to any other sentence the court may impose, and unless 
otherwise ordered by the court pursuant to Subsection (6)(c), the defendant shall pay 
restitution to the county for the cost of incarceration and costs of medical care provided to 
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the defendant while in the county correctional facility before and after sentencing if: 
(i) the defendant is convicted of criminal activity that results in incarceration in 
the county correctional facility; and 
(ii) (A) the defendant is not a state prisoner housed in a county correctional 
facility through a contract with the Department of Corrections; or 
(B) the reimbursement does not duplicate the reimbursement provided under 
Section 64-13e-104 if the defendant is a state probationary inmate, as defined in Section 
64-13e-102, or a state parole inmate, as defined in Section 64-13e-102. 
(b) (i) The costs of incarceration under Subsection (6)(a) are the amount 
determined by the county correctional facility, but may not exceed the daily inmate 
incarceration costs and medical and transportation costs for the county correctional 
facility. 
(ii) The costs of incarceration under Subsection (6)(a) do not include expenses 
incurred by the county correctional facility in providing reasonable accommodation for an 
inmate qualifying as an individual with a disability as defined and covered by the federal 
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. 12101 through 12213, including 
medical and mental health treatment for the inmate's disability. 
(c) In determining whether to order that the restitution required under this 
Subsection (6) be reduced or that the defendant be exempted from the restitution, the 
court shall consider the criteria under Subsections 77-38a-302(5)(c)(i) through (iv) and 
shall enter the reason for its order on the record. 
(d) If on appeal the defendant is found not guilty of the criminal activity under 
Subsection (6)(a)(i) and that finding is final as defined in Section 76-1-304, the county 
shall reimburse the defendant for restitution the defendant paid for costs of incarceration 
under Subsection (6)(a). 
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76-6a-2. Definitions. 
As used in this chapter: 
(1) (a) "Compensation" means money, money bonuses, overrides, prizes, or other 
real or personal property, tangible or intangible. 
(b) "Compensation" does not include payment based on the sale of goods or 
services to anyone purchasing the goods or services for actual personal use or 
consumption. 
(2) "Consideration" does not include payment for sales demonstration equipment 
and materials furnished at cost for use in making sales and not for resale, or time or effort 
spent in selling or recruiting activities. 
(3) "Person" includes a business trust, estate, trust, joint venture, or any other legal 
or commercial entity. 
(4) "Pyramid scheme" means any sales device or plan under which a person gives 
consideration to another person in exchange for compensation or the right to receive 
compensation which is derived primarily from the introduction of other persons into the 
sales device or plan rather than from the sale of goods, services, or other property. 
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76-6a-4. Operation as felony — Participation as misdemeanor ~ Investigation 
— Prosecution. 
(1) Any person who knowingly organizes, establishes, promotes, or administers a < 
pyramid scheme is guilty of a third degree felony. 
(2) Any person who participates in a pyramid scheme only by receiving 
compensation for the introduction of other persons into the pyramid scheme rather than 
from the sale of goods, services, or other property is guilty of a class B misdemeanor. 
(3) The appropriate county attorney or district attorney has primary responsibility 
for investigating and prosecuting criminal violations of this chapter. 
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77-38a-302. Restitution criteria. 
(1) When a defendant is convicted of criminal activity that has resulted in 
pecuniary damages, in addition to any other sentence it may impose, the court shall order 
that the defendant make restitution to victims of crime as provided in this chapter, or for 
conduct for which the defendant has agreed to make restitution as part of a plea 
disposition. For purposes of restitution, a victim has the meaning as defined in 
Subsection 77-38a-102(14) and in determining whether restitution is appropriate, the 
court shall follow the criteria and procedures as provided in Subsections (2) through (5). 
(2) In determining restitution, the court shall determine complete restitution and 
court-ordered restitution. 
(a) "Complete restitution" means restitution necessary to compensate a victim for 
all losses caused by the defendant. 
(b) "Court-ordered restitution" means the restitution the court having criminal 
jurisdiction orders the defendant to pay as a part of the criminal sentence at the time of 
sentencing or within one year after sentencing. 
(c) Complete restitution and court-ordered restitution shall be determined as 
provided in Subsection (5). 
(3) If the court determines that restitution is appropriate or inappropriate under 
this part, the court shall make the reasons for the decision part of the court record. 
(4) If the defendant objects to the imposition, amount, or distribution of the 
restitution, the court shall allow the defendant a full hearing on the issue. 
(5) (a) For the purpose of determining restitution for an offense, the offense shall 
include any criminal conduct admitted by the defendant to the sentencing court or to 
which the defendant agrees to pay restitution. A victim of an offense that involves as an 
element a scheme, a conspiracy, or a pattern of criminal activity, includes any person 
directly harmed by the defendant's criminal conduct in the course of the scheme, 
conspiracy, or pattern. 
(b) In determining the monetary sum and other conditions for complete restitution, 
the court shall consider all relevant facts, including: 
(i) the cost of the damage or loss if the offense resulted in damage to or loss or 
destruction of property of a victim of the offense; 
(ii) the cost of necessary medical and related professional services and devices 
relating to physical or mental health care, including nonmedical care and treatment 
rendered in accordance with a method of healing recognized by the law of the place of 
treatment; 
(iii) the cost of necessary physical and occupational therapy and rehabilitation; 
(iv) the income lost by the victim as a result of the offense if the offense resulted 
in bodily injury to a victim; 
(v) up to five days of the individual victim's determinable wages that are lost due 
to theft of or damage to tools or equipment items of a trade that were owned by the victim 
and were essential to the victim's current employment at the time of the offense; and 
(vi) the cost of necessary funeral and related services if the offense resulted in the 
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death of a victim. 
(c) In determining the monetary sum and other conditions for court-ordered 
restitution, the court shall consider the factors listed in Subsections (5)(a) and (b) and: < 
(i) the financial resources of the defendant and the burden that payment of 
restitution will impose, with regard to the other obligations of the defendant; 
(ii) the ability of the defendant to pay restitution on an installment basis or on 
other conditions to be fixed by the court; 
(iii) the rehabilitative effect on the defendant of the payment of restitution and the 
method of payment; and 
(iv) other circumstances which the court determines may make restitution 
inappropriate. 
(d) (i) Except as provided in Subsection (5)(d)(ii), the court shall determine 
complete restitution and court-ordered restitution, and shall make all restitution orders at 
the time of sentencing if feasible, otherwise within one year after sentencing. 
(ii) Any pecuniary damages that have not been determined by the court within one 
year after sentencing may be determined by the Board of Pardons and Parole. 
(e) The Board of Pardons and Parole may, within one year after sentencing, refer 
an order of judgment and commitment back to the court for determination of restitution. 
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78A-4-103. Court of Appeals jurisdiction. 
(1) The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to issue all extraordinary writs and to 
issue all writs and process necessary: 
(a) to carry into effect its judgments, orders, and decrees; or 
(b) in aid of its jurisdiction. 
(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of 
interlocutory appeals, over: 
(a) the final orders and decrees resulting from formal adjudicative proceedings of 
state agencies or appeals from the district court review of informal adjudicative 
proceedings of the agencies, except the Public Service Commission, State Tax 
Commission, School and Institutional Trust Lands Board of Trustees, Division of 
Forestry, Fire, and State Lands actions reviewed by the executive director of the 
Department of Natural Resources, Board of Oil, Gas, and Mining, and the state engineer; 
(b) appeals from the district court review of: 
(i) adjudicative proceedings of agencies of political subdivisions of the state or 
other local agencies; and 
(ii) a challenge to agency action under Section 63G-3-602; 
(c) appeals from the juvenile courts; 
(d) interlocutory appeals from any court of record in criminal cases, except those 
involving a charge of a first degree or capital felony; 
(e) appeals from a court of record in criminal cases, except those involving a 
conviction or charge of a first degree felony or capital felony; 
(f) appeals from orders on petitions for extraordinary writs sought by persons who 
are incarcerated or serving any other criminal sentence, except petitions constituting a 
challenge to a conviction of or the sentence for a first degree or capital felony; 
(g) appeals from the orders on petitions for extraordinary writs challenging the 
decisions of the Board of Pardons and Parole except in cases involving a first degree or 
capital felony; 
(h) appeals from district court involving domestic relations cases, including, but 
not limited to, divorce, annulment, property division, child custody, support, parent-time, 
visitation, adoption, and paternity; 
(i) appeals from the Utah Military Court; and 
(j) cases transferred to the Court of Appeals from the Supreme Court. 
(3) The Court of Appeals upon its own motion only and by the vote of four judges 
of the court may certify to the Supreme Court for original appellate review and 
determination any matter over which the Court of Appeals has original appellate 
jurisdiction. 
(4) The Court of Appeals shall comply with the requirements of Title 63G, 
Chapter 4, Administrative Procedures Act, in its review of agency adjudicative 
proceedings. 
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4. 
RULE 3, UTAH RULES OF APPELLATE 
PROCEDURE 
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Rule 3. Appeal as of right: how taken. 
(a) Filing appeal from final orders and judgments. An appeal may be taken 
from a district or juvenile court to the appellate court with jurisdiction over the 
appeal from all final orders and judgments, except as otherwise provided by law, 
by filing a notice of appeal with the clerk of the trial court within the time allowed 
by Rule 4. Failure of an appellant to take any step other than the timely filing of a 
notice of appeal does not affect the validity of the appeal, but is ground only for 
such action as the appellate court deems appropriate, which may include 
dismissal of the appeal or other sanctions short of dismissal, as well as the 
award of attorney fees. 
(b) Joint or consolidated appeals. If two or more parties are entitled to appeal 
from a judgment or order and their interests are such as to make joinder 
practicable, they may file a joint notice of appeal or may join in an appeal of 
another party after filing separate timely notices of appeal. Joint appeals may 
proceed as a single appeal with a single appellant. Individual appeals may be 
consolidated by order of the appellate court upon its own motion or upon motion 
of a party, or by stipulation of the parties to the separate appeals. 
(c) Designation of parties. The party taking the appeal shall be known as the 
appellant and the adverse party as the appellee. The title of the action or 
proceeding shall not be changed in consequence of the appeal, except where 
otherwise directed by the appellate court. In original proceedings in the appellate 
court, the party making the original application shall be known as the petitioner 
and any other party as the respondent. 
(d) Content of notice of appeal. The notice of appeal shall specify the party or 
parties taking the appeal; shall designate the judgment or order, or part thereof, 
appealed from; shall designate the court from which the appeal is taken; and 
shall designate the court to which the appeal is taken. 
(e) Service of notice of appeal. The party taking the appeal shall give notice 
of the filing of a notice of appeal by serving personally or mailing a copy thereof 
to counsel of record of each party to the judgment or order; or, if the party is not 
represented by counsel, then on the party at the party's last known address. A 
certificate evidencing such service shall be filed with the notice of appeal. If 
counsel of record is served, the certificate of service shall designate the name 
of the party represented by that counsel. 
(f) Filing fee in civil appeals. At the time of filing any notice of separate, joint, 
or cross appeal in a civil case, the party taking the appeal shall pay to the clerk of 
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the trial court the filing fee established by law. The clerk of the trial court shall 
accept a notice of appeal regardless of whether the filing fee has been paid. 
Failure to pay the filing fee within a reasonable time may result in dismissal. 
(g) Docketing of appeal. Upon the filing of the notice of appeal, the clerk of 
the trial court shall immediately transmit a certified copy of the notice of appeal, 
showing the date of its filing, and a statement by the clerk indicating whether the 
filing fee was paid and whether the cost bond required by Rule 6 was filed. Upon 
receipt of the copy of the notice of appeal, the clerk of the appellate court shall 
enter the appeal upon the docket. An appeal shall be docketed under the title 
given to the action in the trial court, with the appellant identified as such, but if the 
title does not contain the name of the appellant, such name shall be added to the 
title. 
Advisory Committee Notes 
The designation of parties is changed to conform to the designation of 
parties in the federal appellate courts. 
The rule is amended to make clear that the mere designation of an appeal as 
a "cross-appeal" does not eliminate liability for payment of the filing and 
docketing fees. But for the order of filing, the cross-appellant would have been 
the appellant and so should be required to pay the established fees. 
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